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1 Introduction
The importance of R&D in technology-intensive sectors has been widely highlighted by the
Schumpeterian theory (e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992,
1998)). In this literature, patent law - or more generically, intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection - plays a primary role in the process of economic development. Thanks to the granting
of patents, rms establish a products virtual everlasting monopoly, which allows entrepreneurs
to recoup the enormous amounts of cash spent on R&D. Yet, it is quite a widespread belief that
collecting and making use of some kind of information about competitors is as crucial an element
as R&D for market leadership. However, not all the available practices of information gathering,
often called corporate intelligence, are acceptable and many of them are often considered extreme
forms of industrial espionage (or spying).
In this paper we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of R&D investment and cor-
porate intelligence in which the latter takes the form of information gathering. Our research
objectives are twofold. First, we are interested in studying the long-run e¤ects of corporate
intelligence on innovation and growth. Second, we are interested in building a tractable analyt-
ical framework to study the long-run implications of IPR protection on corporate intelligence,
R&D investment and growth.
In order to plug information gathering into the standard Schumpeterian growth model, we
introduce two main modications to the standard Grossman and Helpmans (1991) quality-
ladder scheme. The rst modication consists in assuming that each R&D race is a two-stage
activity, meaning that each R&D rm invests resources to discover the way to produce a higher
quality product for rst, and then tries to render the discovery useful for business purposes. In
the meanwhile, rms do not patent the discovery and try to keep any condential information
regarding the new discovery secret from their competitors. The second modication consists
in assuming that the trade secret is weakly protected, meaning that the IPR protection sys-
tem does not provide enough protection against illegitimate practices of corporate intelligence.
This assumption allows us to distinguish two di¤erent sources of information disclosure. The
rst source is the involuntary leakage of sensitive information due, for instance, to incidental
disclosure by workers. The second source of information disclosure is related to the voluntary
information gathering activity carried out by market rivals through costly corporate intelligence.
We nd that a steady-state equilibrium with information gathering exists only to the extent
to which the degree of IPR protection is not very high. Specically, we nd that when the
economy starts with a degree of IPR protection that is high enough to discourage any form
of corporate intelligence, the economy has no room for information gathering and works as a
1
standard fully-endogenous growth model with quality innovation; in contrast, when the economy
starts with a low degree of IPR protection, corporate intelligence becomes more attractive to
rms and the economy has room for information gathering. When the latter occurs, we nd
that strengthening IPR protection - in terms of introducing a new scheme of protection for a
rms condential data - leads to a permanent increase in the steady-state innovation rate but
also to a permanent decrease in the steady-state level of per capita consumption expenditure.
Up to now, economic theory (especially on innovation, IPR protection and growth) has paid
much more attention to imitation than information gathering, particularly that on technology
transfer and North-South trade (e.g., Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), and Glass and Saggi (2002)
among others)1. Cozzi (2001) represents the only exception in which alternative phenomena of
misappropriation such as interim imitation and spying, along with their long-run implications
for technological change and economic growth, are theoretically analyzed. Technically speaking,
Cozzi (2001) builds a general equilibrium model of growth and spying to study the choice of being
either a producer of new ideas or a spy. It nds that the existence of a positive espionage activity
depends on the size of the population and that a larger population increases the equilibrium
number of spies without a¤ecting long-run growth.
This paper presents at least three drawbacks. Firstly, even though the steady-state equi-
librium features a roughly constant rate of patenting, Cozzis model features both a constant
patents-per-researcher ratio and time-invariant innovative R&D employment. This result is not
consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Jones (1995) and Kortum (1996), who show
that the total amount of resources devoted to R&D in the most important industrial economies
has grown dramatically in spite of the roughly constant rate of patenting. Secondly, in the pres-
ence of a growing population Cozzis model predicts that the fraction of labor engaged in spying
activities tends to grow without bounds, meaning that no steady-state equilibrium with spying
exists because of the scale e¤ect2. Finally, Cozzi is unclear about what spying is in his model.
In the paper, in fact, he claims that he is calling spying an activity that contemplates both
lawful and ethical searching for inspiration and illegal industrial espionage" (see Cozzi (2001,
p. 68)), which is equal to saying that spying consists of all those R&D activities other than
innovation. We think this approach makes it di¢ cult to disentangle what is the lawful practice
1Closed economy models of growth with innovation and imitation usually do not pay much attention to the
IPR-related aspects of imitation and copying. See, in particular, Rustichini and Schmitz (1991), Segerstrom
(1991) and Mukoyama (2003).
2Parello (2005) uses a di¤erent approach to generate a non-explosive rate of espionage activity by introducing
increasing di¢ culty in R&D along the lines suggested by Segerstrom (1998). He nds that in the long run the
economy grows semi-endogenously and that any change in the structural parameters of the economy a¤ects the
steady-state growth rate of the economy only temporarily.
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of information gathering from what is the result of an illegal activity of corporate espionage,
thereby rendering Cozzis model unsuitable for studying IPR issues.
Our model di¤ers from Cozzi (2001) in at least two respects. First, our model plugs trade
secrets into the standard quality-ladder model and focuses on information gathering rather than
spying. Second, our model adopts a dilution scheme for R&D and generates a scale-invariant
fully-endogenus growth process where all research activities, including forms of R&D other than
pure innovation, do not depend on the scale of the economy.
Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) adopt a similar approach to ours to avoid explosive paths for
industrial espionage. Nonetheless, our paper departs from Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) along
at least two dimensions. On the one hand, our model does not need any restriction on the
growth rate of population in order to generate a scale invariant rate of activity for corporate
intelligence. On the other hand, the paper presents a di¤erent approach to modelling the rms
choice between innovation and an alternative form of R&D that consists in splitting the process
of R&D investment into two stages: a rst stage of creating ideas (pure innovation), and a second
stage of rening of the ideas in which inventive rms competes with the corporate intelligence
in making pure innovations useful for business purposes.
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 sets up the model and presents the main
di¤erences between it and a standard R&D-based growth model. Section 3 solves the model
for the steady-state equilibrium and analyzes its long-run properties. Section 4 analyzes the
steady-state equilibrium e¤ect of stronger IPR protection. Section 5 discusses the main results
of the model and tries to provide a possible policy interpretation of them. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Overview of the model
The industrial framework consists of a continuum of industries indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. In each
industry !, rms are distinguished by the quality of the products they produce, where j (!; t)
denotes the quality vintage (or state of the art) of industry ! at instant t. At time t = 0, the
state of the art of each industry is j = 0 and only one rm knows how to produce the j = 0
quality product.
To learn how to improve the state of the art, rms participate in innovative R&D races.
In contrast to the basic Schumpeterian growth models of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), we assume that each R&D race is a two-stage activity. In the
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rst stage, rms invest resources to discover the way to produce the next quality rung j + 1
and, if successful, use the trade secret in order to keep information secret. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that keeping information secret is costless but also that there is a risk of
leakage due to the incidental disclosure of sensitive information. In the second stage, rms
try to render the discovery useful for business purposes through a renement of the previous
discovery. This renement can be independently carried out either by the innovating rm
(henceforth the author) or some rivals, whose main objective is to collect sensitive information
through corporate intelligence, write down a marketable minor variation in competition with
the author and then try to beat the author in a "race to the Patent O¢ ce" similar to that
proposed by Cozzi (2001).
The probability that an author will win the race to the Patent O¢ ce is exogenously given,
while the probability that a rival will win the race is endogenously given and depends on their
intelligence e¤ort. We assume that the winner of the "race to the Patent O¢ ce" becomes the
only producer of the j + 1 quality product, regardless of whether he is actually the author or
not. We focus on the steady-state equilibrium in which all innovative activity takes place in the
long run and in which innovation takes the form of improvements in the quality of products.
2.2 Preferences and technologies
The economy has a xed number -normalized to one- of identical households that provide labor
services in exchange for wages. Each household is modelled as a dynastic family, whose growing
size is given by L (t) = ent (with L (0) = 1 and n > 0).
The representative household chooses from a continuum ! 2 [0; 1] of products available
at di¤erent quality levels. Perfect foresight of the future value of wages w (t) and the rate of
interest r (t) implies that, for a given sequence of pairs fw (t) ; r (t)g, t 2 (0;1), the problem
for the representative household is to choose a sequence of consumption which maximizes the
discounted utility:
max
c
U 
Z 1
0
e ( n)t log u (t) dt,  > n (1)
subject to:
log u (t) 
Z 1
0
log [jqj (!; t) dj (!; t)] d! (2)
c (t) 
Z 1
0
[jpj (!; t)  dj (!; t)] d! (3)
W (t) +A (t) =
Z 1
t
c ()  ene [R() R(t)]d (4)
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Eq. (2) is the Cobb-Douglas specication of the consumption index, where dj (!; t) denotes
the quantity consumed of a product of quality j produced in industry ! at time t and qj (!; t) 
j(!;t) denotes the overall quality level of industry ! after j (!; t) innovations, with  > 1
measuring the size of quality improvements or quality jump.3 Eq. (3) is the static budget
constraint which assumes that in each instant of time t the per capita expenditure of the
representative household, c (t), must equate the value of all nal goods consumed, where pj (!; t)
denotes the price of a product of quality j produced in industry ! at time t. Finally, Eq. (4) is
the intertemporal budget constraint which assumes that the sum of the households discounted
wage income, W (t), and the present value of the representative households nancial assets,
A (t), must be equal to the discounted value of consumption, where R (t)  R t0 r () d is the
cumulative interest rate and _R (t) = r (t) denotes the instantaneous interest rate at time t.
At each instant t, the representative household allocates expenditure to maximize the utility
per person u (t), given the prevailing market prices of each brand !. Because of the separability
of Eq. (1), the representative consumers maximization problem can be solved in three steps.
The rst step is to choose the allocation of expenditure for each product across available qual-
ity levels. To solve this problem, the representative consumer allocates expenditure for each
product at each instant to the quality level j (!; t) o¤ering the lowest quality-adjusted price,
pj (!; t) =qj (!; t). We assume that when quality-adjusted prices are the same for two products
of di¤erent vintages, consumers only buy the higher quality product.
The second step consists in choosing the allocation of expenditure across existing brands ! 2
[0; 1] by maximizing discounted utility (2) subject to (3). Given the Cobb-Douglas specication
of the consumption index (2), solving this optimal control problem leads to the demand function
for the product with the lowest quality-adjusted price in industry ! given by
d (!; t) =
c (t)
p (!; t)
(5)
Finally, the third step is to choose the allocation of lifetime wealth across time by maximizing
discounted utility (1), given Eqs. (3) and (4), and subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(4). The solution for this optimal control problem leads to the usual Euler equation
_c (t)
c (t)
= r (t)   (6)
According to Eq. (6), higher market interest rates induce consumers to save more now and
spend later, resulting in an increased growth rate of per capita consumption.
3Because j is increasing in j, (2) captures the idea that consumers like higher quality and also has the
property that vertically di¤erentiated products in a given industry substitute perfectly for one another once the
appropriate adjustment is made for quality di¤erences.
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The manufacturing sector of the economy is imperfectly competitive. As in Grossman and
Helpman (1991), a patent is needed to enter industries and produce the next higher-quality
product. Once successful, production technology is the same across industries and one unit
of general labor is required to produce one unit of output. The labor market is perfectly
competitive and labor is the numéraire of the model. This means that rms have a common
marginal cost of production equal to one.
We assume Bertrand price competition between leaders and followers. Since (5) presents
unitary elasticity4, innovation is always non-drastic and quality leaders can always drive com-
petitors out of the market by underpricing followers. Indeed, with the follower charging a price
equal to marginal cost, the quality leader earns the prot ow  (t) = (1  1=~p) c (t)L (t) from
charging the price ~p   and zero prots otherwise. As a result, by setting price ~p  , each
quality leader captures the entire industry market and will perform the same ow of sales equal
to D (t) = c (t)L (t) =. Accordingly, all leaders have the same prot ow given by
 (t) =

1  1


c (t)L (t) (7)
whereas all followers decide to stay in the market without producing.
2.3 The research sector
2.3.1 Research and development
To introduce new ideas, rms participate in stochastic R&D races aimed at discovering higher-
quality nal consumption goods. We assume free entry into each inventive R&D race and the
existence of a common constant returns to scale technology available to all racers.
Any rm i that hires `i (!; t) units of labor (henceforth R&D workers) in industry ! at time
t is able to introduce a useful idea to develop the next quality rung j + 1 with instantaneous
probability (or Poisson arrival rate):
Ii (!; t) =
`i (!; t)
b (t)
(8)
where b > 0 is a technology parameter and  (t) is a R&D di¢ culty index which tells us how
the state of technology evolves over time.
The  (t) term in the denominator of (8) is adopted in order to rule out the scale e¤ect
property of the early vintage of R&D-based endogenous growth models -e.g. Romer (1990),
4This is the result of the Cobb-Douglas specication adopted by the consumption index (2), which implies that
the elasticity of substitution between every pair of product brands is equal to one. For an alternative approach
with drastic innovation see, among others, Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) and Dinopoulos and Thompson
(1998).
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Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).5 The specication adopted in
this paper is the so-called PEG (Permanent Economic Growth) specication, which is given by:
 (t) = L (t) (9)
where  > 0 is an exogenous parameter. According to (9), as the population grows,  (t)
increases over time and innovating becomes more di¢ cult. The specication adopted by (9) can
be justied by saying that R&D di¢ culty is proportional to the size of the market because of
organizational costs related to product distribution (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999)).
2.3.2 Information gathering and corporate intelligence
Instead of setting up research labs, rms can invest resources in information gathering and
corporate intelligence. Corporate intelligence consists of all those activities aimed at gathering
relevant and up-to-date information about rivalsmarket activities, such as market research,
product development plans, research and development, etc.
Any rm i that hires si (!; t) units of labor (henceforth market researchers) in industry !
at time t is able to come up with a radical idea and modify it into the quality product j + 1
with instantaneous probability (or Poisson arrival rate):
i (!; t) =
si (!; t)
 (t)
, with  (t)  L (t) (10)
where  > 0 is an exogenous technology parameter reecting the degree of IPR protection in
the economy and  (t) is a di¢ culty index which tells us how di¢ cult information gathering is
as time goes by.
We interpret parameter  as the "red line" separating what is acceptable and unacceptable
practice of information gathering, whose level depends on the amount of information covered
by the trade secret. The greater the set of information protected by every trade secret, the
higher the value of  and the higher the probability for the author to patent his own discovery.
Consequently,  can be seen as a measure of the degree of protection of a rms condential
information.
The presence of the L (t) term in the denominator of (10) can be justied in the following
way. Any increase in the size of the population, L (t), could potentially translate into either
greater pure R&D or greater corporate intelligence, or both. If the size of corporate intelligence
5Jones (1995) has persuasively criticized the empirical validity of this prediction by pointing out that several
measures of R&D resources (such as R&D expenditure or the number of scientists and engineers in R&D) exhibit
exponential growth in sharp contrast to the stationary per capita output and total factor productivity growth
rates.
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increases because of the increase in the size of the workforce, it will also reduce the chances of
a worker nding an idea that has not yet been used for business purposes: the more corporate
intelligence there is around, the less one single worker can gain from being ready to nd ideas.
This is a sort of competition e¤ect which reduces the instantaneous probability that one worker
will come up with the right idea because of the presence of a larger number of workers gathering
information.6
2.3.3 The optimal R&D choice
In this section we outline the essential features of R&D investment. The problem for each rm
is to decide whether to invest resources in either R&D or information gathering. Consider rst
the case in which rm i decides to do R&D by setting up a research lab. Once successful in
introducing a radically new idea, the rm resorts to trade secrets protection and goes on to the
second stage of R&D which consists in making the discovery useful for business purposes.
Trade secret protection does not preclude sensitive information outowing from the rm due
to both incidental disclosure and corporate intelligence. The leakage of the secret thus depends
both on the technical complexity of hiding innovations and the strength of IPR protection.
Following Franzoni and Denicolò (2004), we assume that the event of an incidental disclosure
follows a Poisson process with an exogenous arrival rate equal to  > 0.
Let v (!; t) denote the expected discounted prot for winning an R&D race in industry !
at time t. The authors probability of successfully modifying the rst-stage innovation is the
same across industries and given by the exogenous parameter .7 Since the "race to the Patent
O¢ ce" takes place instantaneously, the prize of winning the race is given by:Z 1
0
e (++)sv (!; t) ds =
v (!; t)
+ + 
:
Next, the rm chooses the optimal labor input that solves the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
`i


+ + 
v (!; t)
`i (!; t)
b (t)
  `i (!; t)

6Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) use a similar approach, the so-called dilution e¤ect, to avoid explosive paths for the
steady-state R&D investment. In contrast to our paper though, their model does not present any competition
e¤ect among spying, meaning that the incentive to carry out illegal corporate intelligence is not related to the
abundance of spies in the economy.
7Note that the authorss winning rate  does not vary between industries. In a more general setting, cross-
industry di¤erences in this parameter may be the result of di¤erent industry-specic institutional settings of
trade secret protection. In this paper we restrict our attention to analyzing the extent to which  is the same for
all industries, leaving the analysis of cross-industry di¤erences in the authors winning rate to future research.
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Di¤erentiation with respect to `i gives the following free-entry condition:

+ + 
v (!; t)
8<:  b (t) if Ii (!; t) = 0= b (t) if Ii (!; t) > 0 (11)
The left-hand side of (11) is related to the benets of becoming an Author, while the
right-hand side is related to the cost of becoming an Author. Costs exceeding benets would
discourage any possible attempt to create breakthrough ideas, whereas benets exceeding costs
would lead to innovation at an innite intensity. As a result, an equilibrium with a positive and
nite rate of innovation requires (11) to hold with equality.
Observe that according to (11), each R&D rm allocates the same number of R&D workers
to innovative tasks. So, in the rest of the analysis, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium where
` (!; t) = i`i (!; t) is the industry-wide number of innovative R&D workers in industry ! at
time t.
Consider now the case in which rm i decides to gather information by setting up a corporate
intelligence system. The total arrival rate of sensitive information is given by the sum of the
arrival rate of an incidental information disclosure  and the arrival rate of information gathering
 (!; t). The expected reward for the aggregate information gathering sector is:Z 1
0
(+ ) e (++)sv (!; t) ds =
( + ) v (!; t)
+ + 
:
Consequently, the probability that the newly produced idea is caught by one information
gathering rm equals 1= [+ +  (!; t)]8 while the expected ow return of winning the race
to the Patent O¢ ce is given by:
1
+ +  (!; t)
v (!; t)
` (!; t)
b (t)
As a result, rm i chooses its labor input to maximize its expected prots:
max
si

1
+ +  (!; t)
` (!; t)
b (t)
v (!; t)
si (!; t)
L (t)
  si (!; t)

Di¤erentiation with respect to si gives the following free-entry condition:
1
+ +  (!; t)
` (!; t)
b (t)
v (!; t)
8<:  L (t) if i (!; t) = 0= L (t) if i (!; t) > 0 (12)
The left-hand side of (12) is related to the benets of corporate intelligence while the right-
hand side is related to the costs of corporate intelligence. Costs exceeding benets would choke
8As each information gathering rm has the same chance of nding ideas, the individual probabil-
ity of being successful in nding a still not patented innovation is positive and described by density:h
+(!;t)
a++(!;t)
i
= (+  (!; t)) = 1
a++(!;t)
:
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information gathering, whereas benets exceeding costs would lead to information gathering
at an innite intensity. Hence, an equilibrium with a positive and nite rate of information
gathering requires (12) to hold with equality. Note that according to (12), the representative
R&D rm allocates the same number of R&D workers to information gathering. As a result, in
the remainder of the analysis we focus on a symmetric equilibrium where s (!; t) = isi (!; t)
is the industry-wide number of market researchers in industry ! at time t.
Combining (11) and (12), we nd that rm i will decide to become a R&D rm if and only
if the following arbitrage condition holds:
` (!; t)
L (t)
  (13)
Eq. (13) can be thought of as a cut-o¤. After the number of inventors in the total labor
force has reached the threshold , the marginal R&D rm will nd information gathering
more protable than innovation and the number of market researchers will increase as the size
of the workforce not in manufacturing grows. Note that according to (13), each industry !
devotes the same number of R&D workers to innovative tasks, implying that at each instant
the economy-wide share of inventors out of total employment,
R 1
0 ` (!; t) d!=L (t), is constant
and equal to ; and that any increase in R&D employment results in corporate intelligence.
2.4 The labor market
In each industry !, consumers only buy from the current quality leader and pay a price equal
to . Since market demand (5) presents unitary elasticity, at each instant of time t a mass
c (t)L (t) = of workers is employed by current quality leaders. In addition, a mass LR (t) of
researchers (both authors and market researchers) is doing R&D at time t. Since the R&D
races are structurally identical in all industries and the measure of all these identical industries
equals one, the labor market-clearing condition requires:
1 =
LR (t)
L (t)
+
c (t)

(14)
Observe that when IPR are well protected, information gathering is not as protable as
innovating and (13) is not binding. In this case, there is no incentive for rms to invest in
information gathering, with the result that all the employment in R&D is devoted to innovation.
On the contrary, when IPR are not well protected, information gathering is protable for R&D
rms and (13) is binding. As a result, if IPR protection is low enough to guarantee that both
R&D and information gathering are protable in the equilibrium, these two research activities
coexist in the equilibrium and the share of workers in research, LR (t) =L (t) ; will consist of both
authors and market researchers. In the next section, we will assume that  is low and analyze
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the steady-state solution of the model by focusing on the case in which information gathering
is always protable for rms.
2.5 The stock market
To nance their research projects, rms sell equity shares to consumers. The stock market
channels consumer savings towards rms engaged in both R&D and market research and helps
households to diversify the risk of holding stocks issued by these rms. Over a time interval of
length dt, the shareholder receives a dividend  (t) dt, and the value of the monopolist appreci-
ates by _v (t) dt in each industry. Because each quality leader is targeted by R&D rms9, each
shareholder will su¤er a loss of v (t) if further innovation occurs. This event occurs with prob-
ability I (t) dt, whereas no innovation occurs with probability 1  I (t) dt. E¢ ciency in nancial
markets requires that the expected rate of return from holding quality leader stock is equal to
the risk-less rate of return r (t) dt that can be obtained through complete diversication.
A no-arbitrage condition in the capital market thus requires:
_v (t)
v (t)
+
 (t)
v (t)
= r (t) + I (t) (15)
Eq. (15) states that the prot rate from the stock  (t) =v (t) plus the capital gains rate
_v (t) =v (t) equals the market interest rate r (t) plus the instantaneous probability of being driven
out of business by another rm I (t).
Plugging (7) into (15) yields:
v (t) =

1  1


c (t)L (t)
r (t) + I (t)  _v (t)
v (t)
(16)
Finally, by combining the free-entry condition (11) with (16), one obtains the following
no-arbitrage/research equation:10
b =

1  1


c (t)
r (t) + I (t)  n

+ +  (t)
(17)
9This is so because only innovative R&D can threaten a monopoly position by introducing a radically new
idea to produce the j + 1 quality rung. Since we are dealing with a situation in which the race to the Patent
O¢ ce occurs instantaneously, once the method for producing the j+1 quality level has been discovered, at least
one R&D rm (either the original author or a spy) will get the patent and leapfrog the current incumbents
monopoly position instantaneously.
10 Indeed, by using (11) and accounting for the symmetrical industrial setup, it is easy to verify that _v(t)
v(t)
=
_(t)
(t)
= n: This result holds because we choose the instantaneous wage rate as numéraire.
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The no-arbitrage/research equation (17) provides another equilibrium condition for solving
the model. The left-hand side is associated with the cost and the right-hand side with the
returns of innovating. Observe that in line with Cozzi (2001), the returns of innovating equal the
expected ow of prots earned by each leader (7) (appropriately discounted by using the interest
rate and the instantaneous probability of being driven out of business by further innovations)
times the authors probability of winning the race to the Patent o¢ ce, = [+  (t)] :
3 The steady state
3.1 Characterization of the steady-state equilibrium
In this Section we focus on the steady-state equilibrium of the model. In doing so, we suppose
that condition (13) is binding and dene the steady-state equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 The steady-state equilibrium for a dynamic economy with endogenous R&D
investment and information gathering is the situation in which: (i) all endogenous variables grow
at constant rates, (ii) all markets clear, (iii) the long-run rate of innovation is non negative -
e.g. I (t) > 0 for all t -, and (iv) the long-run rate of information gathering is non-negative -
e.g.,  (t)  0 for all t.
The equilibrium system consists of Eqs. (6), (13), (14) and (17) that have to be solved for
the four endogenous variables: the long-run innovation rate I, the long-run rate of information
gathering , the value of innovation v and the per capita consumption expenditure c.
Let "*" denote steady-state values. Because (13) is binding, the innovation rate of the
economy is pinned down in any equilibrium and equals:
I =

b
: (18)
According to (18), the steady-state innovation rate will be higher, (i) the higher the authors
probability of winning the race to the Patent O¢ ce, , (ii) the stronger IPR protection in the
economy, , (iii) the lower the parameter measuring to what extent population growth a¤ects
R&D di¢ culty, , (iv) the lower the technology parameter, b. Thus, in the presence of the PEG
specication for the R&D di¢ culty index, stronger IPR protection has a positive impact on the
long-run innovation rate via a permanent increase in the share of innovative R&D employment
in the economy.
With the innovation rate pinned down by (18), in order to solve the model we need two
equations giving us the steady-state solution for the two remaining endogenous variables c and
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. From (6), constant per capita consumption expenditure c requires r (t) = . Using this
result to substitute for the interest rate and (18) to substitute for the innovation rate in (17),
the steady-state no-arbitrage/research equation is given by
b =

1  1


c
+

b
  n

+ + 
(19)
Intuitively, the left-hand side of (19) is related to the cost of introducing a new radical idea
while the right-hand side is related to its benet. The benet of introducing a new radical idea
consists in the present value of the ow of prots earned by each industry leader (1  1=) c
- appropriately discounted by using the population growth-adjusted interest rate    n plus
the instantaneous probability =b of being driven out of business by a further innovation
- multiplied by the probability that the author can enjoy the fruits of his own innovation
= (+ + ) :
To close the model, we need a side condition describing the resource constraint of the eco-
nomy. This condition is the full-employment condition for the labor market (14). As IPR are not
perfectly enforced, the share of non-manufacturing workers in the total workforce LR (t) =L (t)
can be split into R&D workers - given by (13)- and market researchers, . Consequently, the
full-employment condition for the labor market becomes:
1 =
c

+ +  (20)
Eq. (20) has a natural economic interpretation. The rst term on the right-hand-side is
the share of labor in manufacturing, whereas the last two terms are the share of labor in pure
innovation and information gathering respectively. Eqs. (19) and (20) complete the description
of the steady-state equilibrium of the model. In the next section we carefully discuss under
what conditions a steady-state equilibrium such as that described by Denition 1 exists and
provide a closed form solution for the two main endogenous variables c and .
3.2 The solution
According to point (iv) of Denition 1, a viable steady-state requires a positive rate of inform-
ation gathering. This point can be represented diagrammatically in (; c) space (see Figure
1). Eq. (19) -the R-curve in Figure 1- is globally increasing, whereas Eq. (20) -the L-curve in
Figure 1- is globally decreasing in (; c) space. The unique intersection between the two curves
occurs in the positive orthant if and only if the vertical intercept of (19) is lower than that
of (20). It is easy to check that this result occurs if and only if the following restriction on
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Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium.
exogenous parameters holds:
 < ~   (  1)  b (  n) (+ )
 (+ )
^  < ~  

  1
b (  n)   1

: (21)
where the second inequality is imposed in order to prevent ~ from being negative.
Threshold (21) is strictly related to the R&D arbitrage condition (13). When (21) is obeyed,
Eq. (13) is binding and the mass of workers currently hired by the research sector, LR (t), is
larger than cut-o¤ L (t) ; with the result that the extra-supply of researchers is engaged in
corporate intelligence. This scenario occurs because when the degree of IPR is not very high,
the cost of corporate intelligence is a¤ordable for rms, with the result that they will always
nd it protable to devote any additional unit of labor to information gathering rather than
innovation.
In contrast, when (21) is not obeyed, Eq. (13) is not binding, the mass of workers currently
hired by the research sector is lower than cut-o¤ L (t) and the economy has no room for
information gathering. In this scenario the cost of corporate intelligence is not a¤ordable for
rms, with the result that it is protable for them to devote any additional unit of labor to
pure innovation rather than corporate intelligence. In this last scenario, the model works like a
standard Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous innovation.
Solving (19) and (20) for c and  we obtain:
c =
 (1 + ) [+ b (  n)]
+ b (  n) (22)
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and
 =
 [  (1 + )]  b (  n)
+ b (  n)    (23)
According to (22), a rise (a fall) in the probability of information leakage  raises (lowers)
the steady-state per capita consumption expenditure c and lowers (raises) the steady-state rate
of information gathering .11 Surprisingly, this result tells us that an increase in the outow of
condential information due to incidental disclosure discourages corporate intelligence. Intuit-
ively, an increase in the ow of leakages enlarges the pool of newly produced ideas that can fall
into the hands of rivals. As this new information is freely available to all rms in the economy,
the optimal response of rms is to save resources by investing less in corporate intelligence.
Observe that changes in  do not a¤ect the steady-state innovation rate (19). Consequently,
a change in the IPR protection regime that makes rmscondential information more secure
does not a¤ect steady-state growth.
All these results can be collected in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When restriction (21) holds, a steady-state equilibrium such as that outlined
by Denition 1 exists and is unique. In the steady-state equilibrium, strengthening trade secret
protection is not an e¢ cient tool to reduce information gathering and spur growth.
Given the steady-state pair (22)-(23), the aim of the next section is to study the steady-state
impact of a stronger IPR regime that makes corporate intelligence more expensive.
4 Strengthening IPR protection
According to Proposition 1, a steady-state equilibrium with corporate intelligence exists if and
only if the current strength of IPR protection is lower than threshold (21). Lets now suppose
that the government will decide to strengthen IPR protection. Such an intervention can be
studied through an increase in parameter . Indeed, the level of the  parameter depends on all
those intelligence practices that society considers as acceptable forms of information gathering.
The higher  is, the smaller the set of acceptable practices and the higher the probability that
information gathering can be considered as either the illegal or unethical practice of corporate
intelligence.
11 Indeed, di¤erentiation of (22) and (23) with respect to  gives respectively:
dc
d
=
 [+ b (  n)]
+ b (  n) > 0 ^
d
d
=
 (  1)
+ b (  n)   1 < 0;
where the sign of the second derivative always holds when  >  b (  n) = (i.e. when  > 0).
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Figure 2: Comparative statics: a fall in :
Figure 2 shows how the economy reacts to a permanent increase in .12 Graphically, the L-
curve shifts downwards, while the R-curve shifts upwards. The steady-state equilibrium moves
from point A to point B, where both the steady-state per capita consumption and the steady-
state rate of information gathering decrease.
Proposition 2 For a given rate of information leakages , an increase in  leads to (a) lower
steady-state per capita consumption and (b) a lower steady-state rate of information gathering.
The economic intuition behind this result is not di¢ cult to grasp. Lets start by commenting
on the steady-state impact on corporate intelligence. An increase in  has a twofold impact
on R&D incentives. Firstly, an increase in  makes the cost of corporate intelligence increase
and the productivity of every corporate intelligence unit fall. This encourages rms to invest
more in innovation and less in corporate intelligence, thereby making the steady-state rate of
information gathering fall and eventually disappear once  hits cut-o¤ ~. Secondly, increased
 makes the fruits of innovation more secure and increases the prize for winning the race to the
Patent O¢ ce. This spurs R&D investment and makes the steady-state rate of innovation (18)
increase.
As far as consumption is concerned, a better way of explaining why c decreases in the
new steady state is to focus on the labor full-employment condition (20). As stated above, a
rise in  makes information gathering decrease. Since the mass of workers who are engaged in
12For the sake of space, the remainder of this section only o¤ers a graphical exposition of the comparative
statics results. The analytical details are available in a separate appendix upon request to the author.
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information gathering freed by rms is not enough to fulll the rise in the demand for labor of
pure innovative rms, manufacturing must free workers by reducing their sales in order to reach
full-employment. Consequently, in the new steady-state equilibrium the economy ends up with
more R&D and less manufacturing.
5 Discussion
Thus far we have looked at corporate intelligence from an economic point of view. What has
emerged from the previous sections is that corporate intelligence exists only when  is su¢ ciently
low and that reducing the productivity of corporate intelligence is more e¤ective for economic
growth than protecting the trade secret from involuntary leakages. This result has a remarkable
impact in terms of policy because it directly impinges on the ways a government can tailor the
institutional setting in order to protect condential information. But is there a way of measuring
and determining ~?
As Shing and Spence (2002) point out, there are limits to acceptable forms of information
gathering beyond which corporate intelligence might be considered illegal. In order to provide
guidelines for distinguishing information gathering from illegal forms of R&D such spying, Crane
(2005) has recently proposed a criterion based on ethical concerns that relies on three major
points:
1. The tactics used to secure information;
2. The nature of the information (whether private or condential);
3. Public interest.
As far as the rst point is concerned, the tactics used in gathering information have to be
clearly legal and ethically acceptable. In other words, they can neither take illegal forms, such
as breaking and entering a competitors o¢ ces to steal information or inltrating competitor
organizations with professional spies, nor infringe the so-called deontological code, i.e. the set
of duties of being honest and truthful in business dealings. In this vein, for example, either
searching through a competitors rubbish or contacting a competitor in the fake guise of a
potential customer or supplier can be taken as a form of spying.
As regards the nature of the information, even though the IPR regime can assign rights
to many intangible assets, rms often go to great lengths and invest substantial resources in
trying to keep a great deal of information secret from their competitors. With the emergence
of information communication technology, the ease of replication of digital information, as well
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as the renement of the so-called reverse engineering techniques, the unauthorized accessing
and exploitation of rmsinternal information has increased dramatically over the last decade.
The "theft" or "hacking" of sensitive digital information has thus become a major problem for
many high tech industries and IPR infringements on digital information have been the subject
of numerous recent cases. This is a very di¢ cult problem, whose solution requires policy-making
institutions to correctly identify what the substance of IPR is and how IPR-legislation has to
be adapted to changes in technology.
Finally, intelligence gathering can turn into spying when it can potentially endanger the pub-
lic interest. Public interest issues can arise in at least two cases. First, when the information
acquired generates anti-competitive behavior, including the deliberate removal of competitors or
the entrenchment of a monopoly position. Second, public interest issues may arise when corpor-
ate intelligence is closely related to national or international security, or when the target rms
are involved in designing, producing and servicing military technologies or other security-related
products and services. Obviously, it is not so simple to decide whether an act of intelligence
gathering is in the public interest or not, especially if it risks having major implications for
diplomatic relations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the economic implications of corporate intelligence on long-run
technological change and economic growth. To accomplish this objective, we have presented a
dynamic, scale-invariant Schumpeterian model of growth with trade secret, information leakages
and corporate intelligence, and analyzed the steady-state equilibrium e¤ects of introducing
stronger protection for rmscondential information.
In modelling trade secrets, we have split R&D races into two stages. In the rst stage, rms
invest resources to discover the way to produce a new quality product. In the second, the author
of the discovery engages in a race with outsider rms doing corporate intelligence to become the
rst to introduce a patentable, minor variation to the basic idea. In the passage from the rst
stage to the second, the author tries to keep the discovery secret but faces a positive probability
that some sensitive information about the latest discovery can fall into rivalshands because of
an involuntary information leakage.
We found that the model generates a unique steady-state equilibrium with positive corporate
intelligence activity only if the degree of IPR protection in the economy is su¢ ciently low. We
also nd that every restriction of the IPR regime aimed at increasing the cost of corporate
intelligence is more e¤ective in protecting condential data than helping authors to better
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protect their trade secrets. Based on Crane (2005), we have concluded the paper by proposing
three possible guidelines to identify the boundaries of corporate intelligence and to distinguish
the "legitimate" tactics of information gathering from the "illegitimate" practice of industrial
espionage.
19
References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992), "A model of growth through creative destruction". Eco-
nometrica, Vol.60, pp.323-351.
[2] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1998), "Endogenous growth theory". MIT press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
[3] Cozzi, G. (2001), "Inventing or Spying? Implications for Growth". Journal of Economic
Growth, Vol. 6, pp. 55-77.
[4] Cozzi, G. and L. Spinesi (2006), "Intellectual Appropriability, Product Di¤erentiation, And
Growth". Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 10(1), pp. 39-55.
[5] Crane, A. (2005). "In the company of spies: When competitive intelligence gathering be-
comes industrial espionage". Business Horizons, Vol. 24, pp. 233-240.
[6] Dinopoulos, E. and Segerstrom, P. (1999), A Schumpeterian model of protection and rel-
ative wages. American Economic Review, Vol.89, pp.450-472.
[7] Dinopoulos, E. and P. Thompson (1998), "Schumpeterian Growth Without Scale E¤ects".
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 3, pp. 313-335.
[8] Denicolò, V. and L. A. Franzoni (2004), "Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense".
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 13(3), pp. 517-538.
[9] Glass, A.J. and K. Saggi (2002), "Intellectual Property Rights and the Foreign Direct
Investment". Journal of International Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 387-410.
[10] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman. (1991), "Quality ladders and product cycles". Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, pp.557-586.
[11] Kortum, S. (1996), "Research and Productivity Growth: Theory and Evidence from Patent
Data". NBER working paper No. 4646, Cambridge.
[12] Helpman, E. (1993), "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights". Economet-
rica, Vol.61, pp. 1247-1280.
[13] Jones, C. (1995), "Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models". The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol.110(2), pp. 495-525;
[14] Lai, Edwin L.C. (1998) "International intellectual property right protection and the rate
of product innovation". Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 55, pp. 133-153.
20
[15] Mukoyama, T. (2003), "Innovation, imitation, and growth with cumulative technology".
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50(2), pp. 361-380,
[16] Parello C. P. (2005), "Proprietary Information Protection and the Long-Run Implications
of Industrial Espionage". Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol. 95(5), pp. 91-124.
[17] Romer, P. M. (1990), "Endogenous Technical Change". Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
98, pp. 71-103.
[18] Rustichini, A . and J. A. Schmitz (1991), "Research and Imitation in Long-Run Growth".
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 271-292.
[19] Segerstrom, P. S. (1991), "Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth", Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, Vol. 99, pp. 807-827.
[20] Segerstrom, P. S. (1998), "Endogenous growth without scale e¤ects". American Economic
Review, Vol.88, pp. 1290-1310.
[21] Shing, M.N.K. and Spence, L.J. (2002), "Investigating the limits of competitive intelligence
gathering: is mystery shopping ethical?". Business Ethics: A European Review, Vol. 11(4),
pp. 343-353.
21
Additional appendix to referees (not to be published)
1. Comparative Statics analysis: An increase in 
In this appendix we provide the formal proof of Proposition 2. Consider a steady-state equilib-
rium as that described by the pair (19) and (20). Di¤erentiation with respect to c  and 
gives:
J 
24 dcd
d
d
35 =
24  (++) 1
 (+ )
35 (B.2)
where the Jacobian is given by:
J 
24 1  [+b( n)]( 1)
1 
35
The determinant of the Jacobian is always positive and reads:
jJ j =  [+ b (  n)]
 (  1) :
Let Ji - with i = 1; 2 - denote the matrix formed by replacing the ith column of the Jacobian
by the column vector on the right-hand side of (B.2). Using the Creamer rule yields:
dc
d
=
jJ1j
jJ j =
 [  b (  n) (+ )]
+ b (  n) < 0
d
d
=
jJ2j
jJ j =  
 [+  (+ )]
+ b (  n) < 0
where the sign of the rst derivative holds when  is not very high.
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